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       The current paper by William T. Allen and Han Shen (henceforth AS) assesses the 
Chinese securities markets from aspects that are of central concern in developing these 
markets: the positioning of securities markets in the national system of finance, their size 
and scope, their evolution pattern, the regulatory environment, and the corporate 
governance of the Chinese listed firms. AS carefully document and discuss at length 
several key characteristics of the Chinese securities markets including the share 
segmentation system, the state sector centric market design, concentrated ownership 
structures, low level of liquidity and poor pricing efficiency, limited market access for the 
private sector, the contradictory mandates of the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, the watch dog of the Chinese capital markets), and the control-based 
corporate governance mechanisms used by the listed firms. AS characterize the Chinese 
securities markets as top-down markets designed by the government to ensure the state 
purposes. As such, these markets deem to be politically driven and cannot exert 
significant economic effects on the Chinese economy. AS further conclude that the 
further development of China’s securities markets hinges on whether the Chinese 
government is willing to give up the control over these markets and allow them to serve 
basic economic roles rather than the state purposes. 
       This paper offers many structured details to illustrate the “top down” nature of the 
Chinese securities markets. Such illustrations contribute to the understanding of the 
approaches used by the Chinese government to develop capital markets and assist 
interested readers, especially those with little knowledge about China, to understand the 
working of the Chinese securities markets.  
        I have two principal concerns about the thesis of this paper. First, as I will show 
below, I believe that “top down” is an over-simplified characterization of the Chinese 
securities markets. Second, AS over-emphasize the state sector in their analysis and fail 2 
to consider the quick surge of the private sector. This missing link, as I will show below, 
is arguably a more important shaper of the future of the Chinese securities markets.  
 
1.  Top down meets bottom up           
       Although I agree with AS on all the facts provided in their paper, I believe that “top 
down” is an over-simplified characterization. Several more fundamental institutional 
factors shape the Chinese securities markets. Some of them are top down, and some are 
bottom up.  
     AS correctly point out that the purposes of developing the securities markets in China 
are two fold: one is to find alternative financing sources for the state sector; and the other 
is to improve the state sector’s governance and efficiency. However, together with this 
top down consideration, several other factors are also in a full play to shape the Chinese 
securities markets. These factors include weak legal system and law enforcement, strong 
ties between politics and business, poorly developed financial intermediation that leaves 
the general public with fewer investment vehicles and hence fosters their enthusiasm 
about the securities markets, and the retail investors dominated investor base. In such an 
institutional context, the Chinese government naturally chose an ‘administrative 
governance’ approach to actively control the securities markets. The regulatory 
authorities, especially the CSRC, also have to take balancing acts between control and 
growth, instead of acts solely for the purpose of control.  
   The “top down” nature of the Chinese securities markets is therefore a reflection of 
these driving forces. More fundamental institutional factors lie underneath the control 
approach used in the Chinese markets. This understanding yields a very different policy 
implication – the further development of the Chinese securities markets, to a great extent, 
depends on the overall intuitional improvement rather than the government’s willingness 
to give up their control.  
   Take as one example. Many conclusions in AS result from their analysis of the share 
segmentation system, which has its root traced back to the specific Chinese institutional 
background. Without improving overall institutions, even a complete reform of the share 
segmentation system, which as a matter of fact is under way, cannot solve problems in 
China’s capital markets. 3 
2. The state sector vs. the private sector 
        AS’ characterization of the Chinese securities markets as “top down” markets is 
largely due to the focus of their analysis on the state controlled listed firms in China, 
which used to account for more than 90% of China’s listed firms. However, the structure 
of the Chinese stock markets is changing significantly over time – more and more listed 
firms are now controlled by families or groups of individuals with concerted actions. 
Table 1, which is modified from a table in Liu, Zheng and Zhu (2010), shows that from 
2001 to 2008, the faction of the privately controlled listed firm increased from 12.2% to 
35.8%. If this trend continues, the private firms very likely will account for more than 
50% of China’s listed firms by 2015. Notably, the quick surge of the private sector in the 
Chinese stock markets was not planned by the government. It is largely driven by the 
market mechanisms and the changes in the institutional environment.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
        Since  the  private  firms  are  now  playing an increasingly important role in the 
Chinese markets, an assessment of the Chinese securities markets should factor them into 
the analysis. Firms controlled by individuals or families differ from the state controlled 
listed firms in many ways. As shown in Table 1, a comparison of the ownership 
structures of the privately controlled and the state controlled listed firms shows that (1) 
both the private owners and the state owners build extensive pyramidal structures, and the 
ones built by the private owners tend to be more extensive; (2) the evolution trajectories 
for the privately controlled and the state controlled pyramids are divergent in China from 
2001 to 2008 – while the privately controlled pyramids become streamlined over time 
(measured by an increasing OC and  a decreasing Wedge), the local state controlled 
pyramids get more extensive over time. 
       This dichotomy shows that the private and state owners in China respond to the 
changing economic and institutional conditions in different ways. Fan, Wong and Zhang 
(2010) find that quality of institutions affects the extent of the local state controlled 
pyramids. Specifically, the local states tend to build more extensive pyramidal structures 
in the listed firms when they are subject to a greater degree of market and legal discipline. 
They also find that the extent of local state controlled pyramids is positively correlated 
with firm performance because corporate pyramids allow the ultimate government 4 
owners to transfer decision rights to professional managers, and effectively separate firm 
management from political interferences. Liu, Zheng and Zhu (2010) further point out 
that the quality of institutions affects the privately controlled pyramids in an exactly 
opposite way. The private owners build more extensive corporate pyramids when they 
are subject to a lesser degree of market and legal discipline and more political discretion; 
the extent of pyramidal structures is negatively correlated with the performance of the 
private firms.       
       The dichotomy discussed above thus highlights the importance of distinguishing the 
private ownership and the state ownership in understanding the Chinese listed firms and 
the Chinese capital markets. A more complete assessment of the Chinese capital markets 
should consider these differences.  
 
3.  Concluding remarks 
     AS depict the Chinese securities markets as some sort of caged creature designed by 
the Chinese government to serve the state purposes. This depiction is largely true for 
these markets in their early development stages. However, this creature has already 
grown bigger than the cage. The changes in the institutional environment and the surge of 
the private sector have greatly changed the nature of the Chinese securities markets. The 
top down forces driven by the government are meeting with the bottom up forces driven 
by the market system. Mapping out such interactions and understanding their dynamics 
are the key to assess the Chinese securities markets and understand their future 
developments. 
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Table 1 Corpoate Ownership Structures of the Chinese listed firms by ownership 
types of the ultimate controllers 
The table is modified from Table 3 in Liu, Zheng, and Zhu (2010). It reports the means of 
variables measuring the extent of corporate pyramids by the ownership types of the 
ultimate controllers over 2001-2008. The sample includes all listed firms with the 
ultimate owners controlling at least 20% of voting rights. The sample accounts for more 
than 93% of the universe of the Chinese listed firms. Layer is the number of intermediate 
layers between the ultimate controller and the listed firm. OC is the ratio of ownership 
rights to control rights. Wedge is defined as control rights minus ownership rights. 
 
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008     Total 
 
Panel A: Central state controlled listed firms 
 
# of firms  199  210  230 232 239 244  264  280 1,898
Layer  3.734   3.757   3.774  3.819  3.887  3.898   3.939   4.000  3.860 
Control rights  0.484   0.489   0.476  0.472  0.461  0.431   0.434   0.435  0.458 
Ownership  0.432   0.435   0.416  0.410  0.400  0.374   0.377   0.377  0.400 
OC  0.883   0.871   0.852  0.846  0.850  0.859   0.861   0.855  0.859 
Control rights – 
Ownership Wedge 
0.052   0.054   0.060  0.062  0.060  0.058   0.057   0.059  0.058 
 
Panel B: Local state controlled listed firms 
 
# of firms  660  662  640 644 619 571  568  569 4,933
Layer  3.136   3.160   3.211  3.244  3.278  3.317   3.347   3.404  3.257 
Control rights  0.483   0.483   0.479  0.473  0.458  0.416   0.416   0.422  0.455 
Ownership  0.463   0.459   0.451  0.441  0.424  0.380   0.378   0.381  0.424 
OC  0.955   0.945   0.934  0.926  0.918  0.908   0.900   0.898  0.924 
Control rights – 
Ownership Wedge 
0.020   0.024   0.028  0.032  0.034  0.036   0.038   0.040  0.031 
 
Panel C: Privately controlled listed firms 
 
# of firms  129  178  237 317 332 377  435  474 2,479
Layer  3.698   3.753   3.654  3.546  3.593  3.531   3.421   3.344  3.522 
Control rights  0.355   0.341   0.347  0.353  0.346  0.343   0.360   0.370  0.354 
Ownership  0.212   0.196   0.216  0.225  0.219  0.225   0.256   0.267  0.234 
OC  0.579   0.567   0.603  0.623  0.621  0.642   0.699   0.709  0.647 
Control rights - 
Ownership Wedge 
0.142   0.144   0.132  0.128  0.127  0.118   0.104   0.103  0.120 